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ABSTRACT 
Social networks like Facebook or LinkedIn can be used by companies in various fields like marketing, distribution, product 
development or support for gaining business value. However, in contrast to these opportunities there are also corporate risks 
regarding the usage of social networks, for example resulting brand damages, industrial espionage or inefficiency. So far, 
only little understanding of corporate risks in social networks exists. Just a few single risks are discussed in literature. Thus, 
an extensive literature analysis was conducted for the creation of a systematic risk catalog. For a better understanding of the 
domain, a reference data model was developed consisting of data objects that could be exploited by attackers in social 
networks. Finally, a first approach towards a risk management framework is proclaimed in order to be used by companies in 
social networks. It integrates the identified risks, dedicated process steps and specific IT artifacts. 
Keywords 
Social Networks, Risk, Framework, Threat, Social Media, Business, Data Leakage, Identity Theft. 
INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION 
Online social networks (in the following referred to as “social networks”) like Facebook, LinkedIn or Twitter gained much 
more importance in the last years. 50% of the 800 millions of Facebook users log into their personal account every single day 
and about 7% of the daily internet traffic is caused by Facebook (Wang, Xu and Grosslags, 2011). Additionally, a lot of 
companies increasingly operate in social networks: They have (brand specific) profiles, initiate marketing campaigns or help 
their customers online (Sinclaire and Vogus, 2011). Boyd and Ellison (2007) define social networks as web-based services 
where users can create (semi-) public profile pages and can establish and maintain contacts to other users. According to 
Richter et al. (2009) such web pages are also identified as social networks if their primary effort is not only directed towards 
enabling and supporting social networking but also to providing and exchanging content or media. Examples for these special 
types of social networks are Youtube (characterized by presenting content) and Twitter (allowing micro blogging) (Richter, 
Riemer, vom Brocke and Große-Böckmann, 2009). The growing relevance for companies of existing social networks is 
already mentioned in the literature (Barnes, 2011; Braun and Esswein, 2012; Richter, Riemer and vom Brocke, 2011; 
Segrave, Carson and Merhout, 2011). Companies are able to profit from the social network phenomenon in five business 
areas: Marketing, distribution, human resources, research and development as well as support (after sales service). Braun and 
Esswein (2012) systematized these benefits and developed a framework that is depicted in figure 1. 
So far, the topic of risks has been primarily discussed from a private user’s point of view. Relevant issues in this context are 
privacy and data security (Hasib, 2009). Culnan et al. (2011) emphasize the strategical relevance of corporate risk 
management in social networks from an institutional perspective (Culnan, McHugh, Zubillaga, 2011). Fournier and Avery 
(2011) notice that mitigation of risks in social networks is an essential topic on the management level (e.g., for managing 
reputational risks). For the most part, the literature discusses singular problems (e.g., loosing control during stakeholder 
communication; Pekka, 2010) or gives insight into collections of empirical examples (Langheinrich and Karjoth, 2010). 
Furthermore, Hardy and Williams (2010) show that existing frameworks like ISO 27001/27002 are inadequate to depict risks 
of web 2.0. Such frameworks are unable to deal with threats arising from social networks. In general, a great lack exists 
concerning a comprehensive and thorough understanding of the problem. To the best of our knowledge there is neither a 
domain-specific risk management framework nor a risk management system to solve this problem. Decision makers on the 
ground as well as researchers have only little understanding of specific risks and have no reference for managing, monitoring 
and mitigating those. Of course, it is nearly impossible to develop and establish effective counteractions since the specific 
risks remain unclear.  
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Because of research gaps in theory and practice the first question of the paper is formulated as follows: What are corporate 
risks in social networks and how can they be systematized? The second research question is: What is an adequate corporate 
process for the mitigation of these risks?  
Marketing Distribution Human Resources Research and Development 
Support 
(After Sales Service) 
Individual Marketing for 
influential users  
Customer Involvement 
(contests,...) 
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Market -and Customer 
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Group of Experts 
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Searching Employees 
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Searching Experts  
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Figure 1: Business opportunities in social networks (Braun & Esswein, 2012) 
In order to answer the first question a structured literature analysis was conducted (see second chapter “literature analysis”). 
The identified risks are classified and concluded in a catalog using a risk modeling language. Thus, it is possible to get an 
integrated overview over all threats and their main attributes (see third chapter “risk catalog”). Since social networks are data 
intensive areas it is necessary to point out the most important data objects regarding potential risks. Therefore, a data 
reference model for the analysis of user profiles in social networks is presented in the first part of the fourth chapter “risk 
management framework”. The second part of the fourth chapter deals with the second research questions and the 
development of a first approach to risk management based on the ISO 31000:2009 guidelines. Corporate management of 
risks constitutes the main purpose of that process, which describes how to use and manage the identified risks in the company 
(see third chapter “risk catalog”). Especially the chapter “risk management framework” is relevant for practitioners since it 
gives dedicated process steps for the mitigation of risks. The fifth chapter “conclusion and further research” sums up research 
contributions, limitations and ideas for further research. 
The research work is based on the design science paradigm (Hevner and Chatterjee, 2010). Research artifacts were developed 
as a supporting tool for decision makers. Conceptual and theoretical bases were made for developing a management-
supporting tool (being the superior research goal). This IT based management system is supposed to identify, monitor and 
manage risks arising from social networks.  
LITERATURE ANALYSIS 
In this work, risk is seen as a subjectively perceived threat to achieving organizational goals (Willcocks and Margetts, 1994) 
as well as a set of negative effects caused by uncertainty to corporate objectives (Strecker, Heise, and Frank, 2010). 
Uncertainty is the result of unpredictable events or a lack of information during a decision making process (ISO 31000:2009). 
For example, harsh unexpected customer criticism represents an unexpected event and insufficient management decisions are 
caused by missing data or information (see chapter “risk catalog”). Thus, risk management falls in the remit of top level 
management and requires a top-down-approach (ISO 31000:2009). According to the discipline of information systems risks 
also arise from technical threats. These threats are defined as „any potential occurrence, either accidental or malicious, that 
can have undesirable effects on the assets and resources of organizations“ (Newman, 2006). Consequently, technical threats 
are understood as possible damaging events. The realization of these threats stays uncertain (ISO 31000:2009). Corporate 
risks in social networks can have different causes. First, risks can be inherent in the technology and the characteristics of 
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social networks as itself. Furthermore, characteristics of social media (e.g., user-generated content, sharing, ratings and low 
access barriers) determine some risks. Second, risks can occur due to responses towards the behavior of the company (e.g., 
negative feedback to social marketing campaigns) or because of inappropriate behavior of employees in social networks (e.g., 
unintended revealing of confidential information). Third, risks can occur within the company respectively in managing the 
company. For example, the assessment of activities and efforts on social media and social networks is still a huge problem 
and can cause inefficient resource allocation (Fisher, 2009). 
The analysis method by vom Brocke et al. (2009) was applied for the systematical analysis of the literature. Within this 
method the research scope comprises risks for companies in using social networks. Explicitly, the use of social networking 
technology within companies is not of interest in this paper (e.g., as a intranet tool). In the style of Cooper (1988) the analysis 
focuses on a specific research goal: the consolidation and systematization of existing literature („integration objective“; 
Cooper, 1998; vom Brocke, Simons, Niehaves, Riemer, Plattfaut, and Cleven, 2009). The analysis is conceptual, tries to 
reflect an objective representation of the state of research and integrates the majority of available literature (vom Brocke et 
al., 2009). Relevant search phrases were identified in the phase „conceptualization of the topic“. Since there was very little 
general literature on the topic – except from empirical descriptions (e.g., Langheinrich and Karjoth, 2010) – search phrases 
had to be generalized. Thus, literature that deals with risks of social media and web 2.0 in general was also explored. In the 
analysis phase „literature search“ databases and journals were sifted through using the defined search phrases (vom Brocke et 
al., 2009). Terms from the social network domain (social network, social networking site, online social network, Facebook, 
social media, web 2.0) and the risk context (risk, threat, danger, attack, insult, crime) were combined to 36 search phrases. 
These phrases were applied to the following databases: EBSCOHost, ACM Digital Library, ScienceDirect and ISI Web of 
Knowledge. Additionally, AIS Electronic Library and the IEEE Xplore Digial Library were examined. The results were 
explored by applying forward and backward search. Hence, we investigated 34 articles. Afterwards, every single article was 
analyzed regarding to the title, the keywords and the abstract. If the article seemed to be appropriate to the research scope, 
two researchers analyzed the full text of the paper separately. Finally, the following 13 articles were identified as significant 
literature: Fournier and Avery (2011), Langheinrich and Avery (2011), Hardy and Williams (2010), Hasib (2009), Hoffman 
et al. (2009), Huber et al. (2011), Irani et al. (2011), Newman (2006), Pekka (2010), Timm and Perez (2010), Rudman 
(2010), Wang et al. (2011) and Weir, Toolan and Smeed (2011). The synthesized result of the literature analysis is presented 
in chapter “risk catalog”.  
RISK CATALOG 
In this chapter results of the literature analysis are presented by introducing all risks. 16 risks were identified in total. Six of 
them were classified as main risks (accentuated through a gray-shaded background in figure 2). The other ten are understood 
as “drivers” or primary contributors for the main ones. To gain an overview, all risks and their interdependencies were 
systematized in a model that is depicted in figure 2. The risk modeling method by Strecker et al. (2010) was utilized. Some 
concepts of their RiskML (risk modeling language) were slightly customized. Only the object type “risk” and the covered 
property “visibility” were used. “Visibility” provides information about the recognizability and controllability of a risk. This 
implies how difficult it is to discover (and manage) a risk. The property can have the following values: Invisible, low, 
medium or high. The property “isReversible” describes whether the damage of a risk can potentially be recovered (Stecker, 
Heise and Frank, 2010), which implies how suitable a company can react when a risk occurs. If the value of the property is 
set to “false”, the resulted damage cannot be corrected. As mentioned in chapter “literature analysis”, literature on risks in 
social networks is very rare. Subsequently, detailed information about other properties of risks (e.g., measures or measure 
impacts; Strecker, Heise and Frank, 2010) is missing. Hence, only those properties of RiskML are used which are suitable for 
the general topic. Nevertheless, the RiskML meta model (Stecker, Heise and Frank, 2010; p. 602) was extended by adding 
one property. The property “isInternal” expresses whether a risk is internal (saying that the significant reason is within the 
company) or external. 
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Figure 2: Identified corporate risks in social networks (RiskML model) 
All risks and all relationships between them will be described in detail in the following paragraphs. In addition to the results 
of the literature analysis first basic approaches will be given that could assist in identifying corporate risks in social networks. 
Loss of Control 
The extremely high interconnection in social networks and the inexpensive dissemination of data between users lead to very 
high prevalence rates of messages (Pekka, 2010). The transparency of messages is facilitated by public comments as well as 
by linking and copying (Fournier and Avery, 2011). These mechanisms can be seen as a potential benefit in the field of 
(viral) marketing (Ermecke, Mayrhofer and Wagner, 2009). Beyond this, for companies it is very tricky to react adequately to 
critical or even incorrect messages (Kaplan and Haenlein, 2010; Langheinrich and Karjoth, 2010). Since social networks are 
not controllable by nature, diverse connections between members of different stakeholder groups (employees, partners, 
customers, competitors or former employees) are possible. These connections can cause some collision of interests or even 
data leakage. Moreover, communications about companies are very hard to control regarding content, scope and frequency 
(Mangold and Faulds, 2009). Possible “waves of critics” are very problematic for companies as shown in Langheinrich and 
Karjoth (2010). For companies it is possible to reclaim lost control by applying a high feedback frequency and a 
comprehensive monitoring of all online conversations. Thus, the risk is “reversible” (see figure 2). One indicator for this risk 
can be the percentage of negative conversations about the company in multiple channels (e.g., company profile on Facebook, 
tweets, diverse brand profiles). 
Identity Theft 
The term “identity theft” can be defined as the mischievous takeover of a user’s online identity (Timm and Perez, 2010). 
Either the password of the account is hacked or a new user account is created if the victim has no account in a specific social 
network yet (Hasib, 2009; Timm and Perez, 2010). Thereby attackers profit from weak passwords or easy password questions 
(Hasib, 2009). Furthermore, social networks typically do not request real authentication during the registration process. With 
the help of an occupied user identity an attacker can acquire access to personal data of the victim and is able to spy contacts 
of the victim since they trust him. If the victim is connected to colleagues it is very easy to gain confidential information 
(e.g., organizational structures, hierarchies or customer information) by analyzing private groups or simply asking colleagues 
via private messages. On the other side, an attacker can execute phishing attacks or publish content under the name of the 
victim (as an employee of a company) (Langheinrich and Karjoth, 2010; Weir, Toolan and Smeed, 2011). If the victim is a 
leading employee this could be very crucial since they have a huge (hierarchical) impact. Further, identity theft is dangerous 
for the communication between stakeholders in business social networks like LinkedIn. Another important aspect is the 
(semi-) public accessibility of demographic data in profiles (e.g., birthday or current residence) that can be misused for 
authentication in IT systems (e.g., helpdesks; see Lanheinrich and Karjoth, 2010). This is important with respect to the 
section “industrial espionage”.  
The second kind of identity manipulation in social networks is known as fake profiles (Hasib, 2009; Weit et al., 2011). Fake 
profiles are primarily used to produce artificial interest in a specific topic (e.g., a new product) and to produce electronic 
word of mouth effects (Ermecke, Mayrhofer and Wagner, 2009). Fake profiles can also be used to defame other users (e.g., 
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competitors) via negative postings or ratings. Although social networking providers permit the creation of fake profiles it is 
very easy and cheap to create one. If the “identity theft” risk has occurred it is possible to revoke some of the actions of the 
attacker. For example, it is possible to send an information message to all contacts and to check all sent messages. Hence, we 
assess this risk as “reversible”. But, of course, lost data is irreversibly lost (see section “data leakage”). A possible indicator 
for the identification of identity theft can be a sudden change of a user’s behavior (e.g., unusual content, increasing activities 
or messages).  
Image Damage 
Image damages or reputational damages are named as key risks in the literature (Fournier, and Avery, 2011; Hardy and 
Williams, 2010; Langheinrich and Karjoth, 2010; Rudman, 2010), since reputation is “the currency of Web 2.0” (Fournier 
and Avery, 2011). The image or the reputation of a company can be damaged either by actions of users or by actions of the 
company itself (see subsequent sections). Actions of users can be understood as comments or assessments. Thereby, attackers 
could manipulate a recommendation system as shown exemplarily by Hoffman et al. (2009) and Lang, Spear and Wu (2011) 
and they can also use fake accounts to expedite critical discussions or to disseminate damaging contents. Users utilize the 
interconnectivity of social networks (see section “loss of control”) as well as their low transaction costs (Langheinrich and 
Karjoth, 2010). Companies can also cause harm to themselves if they do not act authentically or if they are not accepted 
within the social network (Fournier and Avery, 2011). If that risk becomes real it is very expensive and difficult to correct the 
image damage. Hence, the risk property “isReversible” was set to “false” (see Figure 2). 
Public Criticism and “Anti” Campaigns 
According to Langheinrich and Karjoth (2010) public criticism is the main reason for image damages. It is possible to 
distinguish between founded and baseless (or even wrong) criticism. Critical statements of (perhaps hypercritical) customers 
(users) are very dangerous for companies since these statements can influence other users (Fournier and Avery, 2011). 
Baseless critic is often based on deliberately placed misinformation or assertions (Langheinrich and Karjoth, 2010) that could 
seem to be concerted “anti” campaigns from competitors (e.g., via different fake profiles). Counter statements against these 
assertions require considerable efforts for companies (Fournier and Avery, 2011). Aside from customers and competitors, 
other stakeholders like NGOs can also use social networks for harsh criticism of businesses. Except these active and obvious 
attacking modes there is also the risk of defamation via reputation systems or recommendation systems (Hoffman et al., 
2009; Lang et al., 2010). Although a proof of manipulation is theoretically possible (Lang et al., 2011) it is very difficult to 
implement under acceptable efforts. In general, companies can reply well to that risk if they try to implement appropriate 
counteractions like public excuses or coupons (as shown exemplarily in Fournier and Avery, 2011). Hence, the reversibility 
of this risk was set to “true”. One possible indicator for that risk is negative ratings in recommendation systems or an 
accumulation of negative comments in profiles or in micro blogs. 
Brand Hijacking 
Another brand risk is the “alienation” of corporate campaigns in social networks by stakeholders (especially customers and 
competitors). User groups use activities of companies in social networks as a bandwagon for the realization of own 
objectives. Langheinrich and Karjoth (2010) and Fournier and Avery (2011) show several possible scenarios for that, e.g., the 
propagation of criticism on profiles or shifting a co-creation contest to a parody (Fournier and Avery, 2011). Another 
scenario deals with the loss of customers to a competitor: If a customer complains about a defective product feature via the 
public profile of a company and a competitor reads that public message, he can try to poach the disappointed customer by 
offering a working product. Since profiles of social networks are mostly public, it is quite easy to monitor competitor’s online 
data streams manually or automatically (e.g., by using monitoring software like Radian6). Once a brand’s profile or a specific 
campaign is “hijacked” it is very hard to regain. So, that risk is not reversible. 
Own Manipulations 
It seems to be attractive (as well as illegal) for some companies to use the abovementioned risks as chances to gain business 
profit. This piquant topic is not discussed in literature so far, although there are even first applications for simulating crowds 
by the orchestration of dozens of fake users. In 2010 the German company Telekom made headlines when it became known 
that a PR agency created fake blogs for the company. Companies have to expect dramatic image damages if such 
manipulations become public. Since that risk is an internal risk (responsibility and control are on management level) it is also 
reversible. Companies can just stop or curb such manipulations. 
Braun et al.  Corporate Risks in Social Networks 
Proceedings of the Eighteenth Americas Conference on Information Systems, Seattle, Washington, August 9-12, 2012. 6 
Industrial Espionage 
While employees and stakeholders increasingly connect with each other in social networks, more and more business data can 
be exchanged as well (e.g., current states of projects, new customers, opinions about the company). Thus, the risk of losing 
confidential data or even intellectual property increases (Hasib, 2009). An analysis of organizational structures or procedures 
is possible if attackers gain entrance to online company groups by applying social engineering or identity theft attacks 
(Deloitte, 2009). Leading employees, IT admins, key users und customer support employees are critically at risk for these 
attacks (Deloitte, 2009). The IT security firm Cyperoam presented a study for analyzing companies on the basis of accessible 
information in social networks. They observed several profiles of employees in different social networks and agglomerated 
them to highly informative “master” profiles. These profiles were analyzed with the help of a content analysis to gain insights 
on the organization and current topics of the company (Hill, 2011). It should be noted, that it is widely possible to automate 
the process of data aggregation by using APIs (e.g., OpenSocial, Facebook Graph or Twitter API) of social networks. 
Generally, that risk is dependent on what business data employees share in social networks and how they configure their 
privacy settings (Wang et al., 2011). A second basic problem is the fact that approximately 40% of all users accept friend 
requests without any verification (Sophos, 2009).  
(Reverse) Social Engineering 
Social networks are particularly well suited for social engineering attacks (Deloitte, 2009; Irani et al., 2011; Langheinrich and 
Karjoth, 2010; Rudman, 2010). In addition to classical social engineering, reverse social engineering is a serious problem 
(Irani et al., 2011). The victim connects with the attacker by itself for different reasons and has therefore a greater confidence 
in the attacking user (Irani et al., 2011). A prerequisite for this is some kind of appeal (in the sense of usefulness) of the 
attacker (e.g., interests, expertise, status). Therefore the attacker has to construct a pretext for attracting the interest of the 
victims (Irani et al., 2011). For example, the attacker can enter appropriate (demographic) data in his profile, built up a 
pseudo network of contacts (fake profiles) or deliver any kind of relevant content. This information is then processed by 
recommendation engines, visitor tracking or demographic-based engines in social networks. The engines give users (victims) 
recommendations about similar users (e.g., based on the profile). Possibly, the user sends a contact request to the attacker 
(Irani et al., 2011). As shown by Irani et al. (2011), these (recommendation) mechanisms as well as APIs of social networks 
can be exploited for such a scenario. Basically that risk is reversible since victims can cancel the relationship to the attacker 
after the recognition of the attack. 
Data Leakage 
Data leakage in social networks is a consequence of inconsiderate publishing and sharing of business data as well as (reverse) 
social engineering (Langheinrich and Karjoth, 2010). Furthermore the use of malicious apps can lead to data leakage if the 
user has only poor privacy settings (Wang et al., 2011). Wang et al. (2011) using an empirical study show the possibility of 
getting a lot of profile data from users and their contacts if they do not configure their privacy settings well enough. A set of 
vulnerable data types in social networks is presented in figure 3 in chapter “risk management framework”. The main reasons 
for that risk are inadequate privacy settings (basically, many users do not have any understanding of this problem) as well as 
unclear access options during the installation process of (Facebook) apps (Hasib, 2009, Wang et al., 2011). Another threat is 
so-called spear phishing (Newman, 2006) that have a high success rate in social networks (Hasib, 2009). Of course, data 
leakage is irreversible since it is not possible to recover lost data. Further, that risk is nearly invisible and so it is very difficult 
to detect. Possible indicators for data leakage could be unsecure privacy settings in user profiles or even the amount of 
installed apps per account. 
Competitive Intelligence 
The exploitation of business data in social networks by competitors is another risk for companies (Hill, 2011; Langheinrich 
and Karjoth, 2010; Weir et al., 2010). Interesting targets are customer relationship management, internal organization and the 
current business situation (e.g., revenue and new projects). As mentioned in Langheinrich and Karjoth (2010) it is possible to 
infer a new customer of a competitor by combining and analyzing his data in business and location based social networks like 
Foursquare. Reasons for that risk are multifarious shared data in different social networks (see figure 3). De facto, this risk is 
– similar to data leakage – nearly impossible to analyze, since there are no obvious indicators. The risk is irreversible. An 
appropriate protection is the limitation of data that is shared in social networks. 
Malware 
As shown in section “data leakage” the installation of third-party apps in employees' user profiles is a serious security 
problem regarding to the possible contamination with malicious software. According to Timm and Perez (2010) 
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approximately 60% of all malware attacks are realized with the help of such apps. Besides, so-called like-jacking 
(Langheinrich and Karjoth, 2010; Timm and Perez, 2010) or redirecting to malware websites by applying tiny URLs (e.g., 
bit.ly that hides the real URL) are possible attacking techniques. Also, the dissemination of spam messages via social 
networks is a serious problem (Huber et al., 2011). Malware damages are irreversible if the damage occurs. 
Inefficiency 
The risk inefficiency contains several internal threats to companies regarding social networks. While employees use social 
networks at work they are distracted from their regular business and become unproductive (Langheinrich and Karjoth, 2010). 
Additionally, the business IT network is charged and could cause performance problems (Rudman, 2010). Some companies 
respond to that problem by blocking entire social networks or single functionalities (Langheinrich and Karjoth, 2010). 
Usually, the detection and treatment of IT problems caused by malware (see section before) can tie up resources. The prompt 
reaction to (hypercritical) customers as well as unrealistic expectations of customers regarding to the replying rate of 
companies lead to high efforts in customer care (Fournier and Avery, 2011). When companies use social media data for their 
own purposes (e.g., competitive intelligence), they have the problem of the unclear verification of data since the “reality” in 
the web can be distorted by fake accounts or false information (Pekka, 2010). The mentioned risk “inefficiency” is internal, 
since it relates to internal processes and structures. Therefore it is also reversible since companies can use experiences to 
counteract the threats. Possible indicators are: Requests to social networks from the company network, efforts for 
troubleshooting or for the support and care of users in social networks.  
Ineffectivity 
Ineffectivity describes the level of realization of a corporate objective with a specific action. In social networks companies 
offer various content and media to get in contact with users. If these actions do not fit the demand of the users, they become 
ineffective since they do not reach the intended objectives (vgl. Fournier and Avery, 2011). The challenge consists in the 
selection of the right actions and campaigns as well as the adequate effort of corporate resources (e.g., implementation costs 
for developing an app or editorial costs for generating content in social networks). This risk is internal, since internal 
processes and decisions primarily cause it. Because of this it is also reversible. Possible indicators are (statistical) key figures 
like downloads, the number of fans or more complex key figures (Fisher, 2009; Murdough, 2009). Internal accounting 
provides information on the costs. 
Governance 
Next to the abovementioned risks there are also explicit internal risks. One issue is the right effort of personnel resources for 
the work in social networks (Fournier and Avery, 2011). Another problem is the communication and collaboration between 
different departments when it is necessary to develop analysis tools or apps (e.g., Social Media Center and IT department; 
Symantec, 2011). Another challenge is the guarantee of process flexibility to react on dynamic and arbitrary customer 
behavior in social networks (Fournier and Avery, 2011). It is also necessary to integrate these processes to corporate process 
landscape. On a technical level it is important to integrate and consolidate data from several sources (e.g., different social 
networks) and to integrate them with business data. In the area of customer relationship management Faase et al. (2011) 
deliver a first approach with their Social CRM. In general, companies have to answer the question whether social networks 
are useful for the company at all. Basically, the management decision on how to act in social networks is critical. Since this 
risk is internal it is also reversible. Possible indicators are communication problems, process and integration problems as well 
as ambiguity about useful key figures and their implications. 
Compliance 
So far, compliance of internal and external legal provisions in social network engagement is thematized poorly in the 
literature (Hardy and Williams, 2010; Langheinrich and Karjoth, 2010). However, there is no question that this is an 
important issue: In regulated industries companies are forced to archive all communication with customers (e.g., dialogues on 
pin walls); nearly 20% of all data are subject to special rules (Hardy and Williams, 2010). Next to the functional specification 
what data have to be archived there are currently huge problems in realizing this requirements from an IT point of view 
(Symantec, 2011). All in all, this risk is internal and reversible. 
Controlling 
The ability to assess company activities in social networks is both an important and unsolved problem of social media in 
general (Murdough, 2009). A stereotyped application of classical key figures is hardly possible (Fisher, 2009). Thus, 
companies have to develop individual key figure systems. Basically, they face the problem of a wrong usage of resources 
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(employees, licenses for software etc.) or a misinterpretation of results. To observe all relevant events in social networks it is 
necessary to use monitoring software like enterprise listening platforms (Fisher, 2009; Fournier and Avery, 2011). However, 
companies face the problem of the selection and operation of these systems (Symantec, 2011). Sometimes, complex systems 
like Radian6 can lead to functional overload. The risk of controlling is internal and thus reversible. Possible indicators are the 
missing ability to make economic statements and assessments regarding to corporate actions in social networks. 
RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK 
In this chapter we present our approach for managing corporate risks in social networks. In the first part we present a data 
reference model that depicts all data objects users deal with in social networks. The second part contains a procedure model, 
based on the ISO 31000 standard (ISO 31000:2009).    
Data Reference Model for Social Networks 
The UML class diagram in figure 3 depicts typical data structures and data objects that can be created and managed by users 
(e.g., employees) in social networks. The model was constructed on the base of a general social networks reference model 
(Braun and Esswein, 2011) and the results from literature analysis (see chapter “risk catalog”). All data objects can – 
theoretically – monitored, analyzed and utilized by competitors or attackers; e.g., for espionage or for the preparation of 
attacks (social engineering). The class “Analysis Object” reflects this fact. For the accessibility of a data object the single 
privacy setting is essential and every data object can be configured individually. An object can be accessible for every user 
(public), only accessible for (specific) contacts (private) or it is not accessible for any user (invisible). The class “Analysis 
Entropy” describes the information content of a data object from an external perspective. For example, the status message 
“Yeah, we’ve the new customer: ABC Inc.!” contains a high information content. The class “Analysis Probability” describes 
the likelihood of an exploitation of a data object and their level of observation. The class “Monitoring Tool” should contain 
all IT tools for monitoring and analyzing data objects in social networks. All these classes belong to the package “External 
Analysis” that stands for the external view to all objects. The rest of the classes are self-explanatory. Hence, only a few 
classes should be explained in detail, like the classes “media file” and “current location data”: If users upload images to their 
profile, also meta information like EXIF data can sent to the webserver. The combination of these data – as well as 
information from location-based services – with data from other social networks can lead to the current or recent positions of 
a user (Hill, 2011). Usually, users act in several social networks. The class “expression” describes explicit statements (e.g., 
comments) of a user that could contain company-internal information. That fact is presented by the attribute 
“insiderInformation” of the class “Topic”. The entire class model is designed as a reference model. It should encourage the 
understanding of structures in social networks as well as instantiated and customized for company specific purposes. 
Therefore, reference modeling techniques can be used (Fettke and Loos, 2007). 
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Figure 3: Data reference model for the analysis of user profiles in social network 
Framework 
To the best of our knowledge, there are no holistic risk management approaches for social networks up to now in literature. 
Only single risks are discussed separately and some operative counteractions are proposed: For the mitigation of social 
engineering Newman (2006) proposes the limitation of public accessible information, the sensitization of employees and the 
implementation of specific technical defensive measures (Newman, 2006). Timm and Perez (2010) emphasize the relevance 
of high secure passwords. Fournier and Avery (2011) show that offensive reactions to public critic in social networks can 
mitigate the risk of image damage. Therefore, companies can use direct and public apologies or redemption offers. 
Sometimes it is also useful to propagate counter statements (Fournier and Avery, 2011). Rudman (2006) proposes a central 
governance of all social network related activities and emphasizes the necessity of monitoring toolsets (Rudman, 2006). In 
the area of controlling Bernoff and Li (2009), Fisher (2009) and Murdough (2009) developed first key figures for the 
assessment. Also in practice there are several ideas: Companies use social media policies, employee trainings and data 
management to keep confidential information in-house (Symentec, 2011). 
In the following section, we present a risk management framework for social networks. According to the ISO 31000 risk 
management standard we used six main process steps and customized them domain specifically. Furthermore, we used 
several artifacts and data elements for describing the input and output of each step. The entire framework is for the usage on a 
management level as explicitly required in ISO 31000. With respect to the limited space of this paper, we do not mention 
specific IT tools.   
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Figure 4: Corporate risk management framework for social networks 
The framework is divided into six main steps: Initial analysis, risk identification, risk analysis and assessment, risk treatment, 
risk evaluation and documentation and reporting. During the initial analysis step the general situation will be analyzed. 
Therefore, occurred problems, attacks and other relevant events are analyzed. All these information come from the so-called 
occurrences repository. Entries in this repository come from internal observations as well as from observations of other 
companies (benchmarking). At the same time it is necessary to consider corporate objectives to identify areas in social 
networks that are critical to secure. In the next step potential risks are identified based on the risk catalog (see figure 3) that is 
developed in the previous chapter. For identifying risks it is necessary to describe indicators for them. Also in chapter “risk 
catalog”, first ideas for indicators were presented.  
To get an overview about the threat of exploitation of employee’s user profiles, the social network reference model (see 
figure 2) should be instantiated by using reference modeling techniques. That helps decision makers to class the risks of the 
risk catalog to the entire context.  
In the next step “risk analysis and assessment”, every single identified risk is assessed regarding its likelihood and the value 
of damages the occurrence of the risks would cause. Thus, it is possible to create risk rankings. The appraised values for that 
come from individual assumptions and experiences. The final result of these steps is a risk assessment table. Afterwards, it is 
necessary to decide whether the analyzed risks are affordable or not. Those risks that cannot be ignored will be treated in the 
next step “risk treatment”. Thereby, the counteraction repository is used. It gives to every documented risk one or more 
counteractions and reaction hints. Some of them are presented at the beginning of this chapter. Of course, the noticed actions 
are not detailed enough and do not deliver counteractions for every risk. Since, it is compulsory to develop and apply 
company specific counteractions. Basically, this is a fairly long-term iterative process. Inevitable for this is the usage of 
monitoring and analysis tools that give the chance to built key figures. The results and experiences (e.g., new risks or 
indicators) of the assessment phase have to be documented as lessons learned in the process phase “risk evaluation”. Also, it 
is necessary to decide whether the risk could mitigate efficiently or not. Finally, all results have to be documented, reported 
and communicated. This is an important step to disseminate all results and sensitize all employees. Also internal 
improvements have to be triggered in this step, for example, regarding to controlling and employee training. Besides, 
guidelines have to be refined and their compliance has to be proofed. As a measure for that we proclaim the so-called 
“friendly monitoring” that control publications of employees in social networks and their inherent “potential of exploitation”. 
Actually, profile pages were audited in that way. Finally, companies have to work on the integration of all process steps and 
corporate processes as well as the corporate risk management system. 
CONCLUSION AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first one dealing explicitly with corporate risks within social networks and it is 
also the first entire approach regarding to a corporate risk management framework. The main research contribution consists 
in discovering and systemizing risks affecting social networks from different domains. We could identify several risks, some 
of their main properties as wells as their interdependencies. Therefore, we worked out a risk catalog based on an extensive 
literature analysis and can answer to the first research question. Further, we developed a reference data model for social 
networks to identify critical data objects and their relationships. The reference model can be used and extended in further 
research to get a better understanding of the entire domain (e.g., object types in social networks and their risk relevance). 
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Finally, we developed a procedure model to give practitioners (especially managers) a guideline to identify risks and react to 
them (the second research question). Thereby, the procedure model integrates artifacts from previous chapters like the 
research catalog (set of all risks) and the instantiated reference model for a specific purpose. In contrast to the hype around 
the business benefits of social networks, this paper shows some negative issues and should improve the awareness and 
management of corporate risks in social networks. 
Nevertheless, there is some limitation of this research work: The risk catalog has to be extended on the base of further 
empirical investigations and the framework should be evaluated in case studies (especially in respect of the design science 
theory; Hevner and Chatterjee, 2010). It is also extremely important to investigate risk indicators and measures for every risk. 
Otherwise it is difficult to operationalize the risks and to control them. Since this is one of the first papers on corporate risks 
in social networks we are not able to give information on this issue yet. Additionally, there is also no reflection of the 
occurring costs while applying the framework. Further research should be dedicated to the extension of the risk catalog as 
well as the development of counteractions and key figures. Also, the conceptualization of corporate actions in social 
networks should be enhanced to examine the real benefit of social networks to companies.   
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